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https://raw.githubusercontent.com/adam3smith/custom-csl/master/mcp-custom-style.csl
50
creator
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157
https://methodscoordinationproject.org/wp-content/plugins/zotpress/
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Hayes, Danny, and Seth C. McKee. 2012. “The Intersection of Redistricting, Race, and Participation.” American Journal of Political Science 56: 115–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00546.x.
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Lee, Frances E. 2003. “Geographic Politics in the U.S. House of Representatives: Coalition Building and Distribution of Benefits.” American Journal of Political Science 47: 714–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1540-5907.00050.
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